The Israeli Flag Over Yemen’s United Capital

On Friday, September 19, Defense Minister Israel Katz posted a tweet on X: “Abd al-Malik al-Houthi, your time will come; you will be sent to meet your cabinet and all the scoundrels of the axis of evil waiting in the depths of hell. The slogan ‘Death to Israel, curse on the Jews’ on the Houthi flag will be replaced by the blue-and-white Israeli flag flying over Yemen’s united capital.” The tweet reveals the deep anger and frustration within Israel’s political-security leadership.

Despite repeated airstrikes on Sanaa, the Houthi capital, the destruction of Hodeidah port—the country’s main import hub—and the declaration of an economic blockade, ballistic missiles and drones continue to be launched from Yemen, striking at Israel and causing real damage. Just yesterday, an explosive drone detonated at the entrance to a hotel in Eilat; miraculously, no one was injured. That same night, millions of Israelis were forced into shelters following a ballistic missile alert.

It seems nothing Israel does changes the Houthis’ behavior. Acting as if they have nothing to lose, they continue their attacks. Yemen is some two thousand kilometers from Israel, the two countries have never fought, and Israel has no claims against Yemen. Yet the Houthis persist in firing missiles, prepared to absorb heavy losses, including the deaths of their leaders, “for Gaza.”

This is a fractured country, mired in bloody civil wars, divided between north and south, with some of the world’s highest rates of poverty, hunger, and infant mortality. And yet, it declares war on a regional power like Israel, which has demonstrated its military capabilities in Beirut and Tehran and now wages all-out war in Gaza.

Where do these weapons come from? How does a country without an industrial base acquire advanced arms when its GDP per capita is just $800—compared to $54,000 in Israel? The answer is clear: Iran. The Houthi tribe, which seized Sanaa in a military coup, is a direct extension of Tehran’s Shiite regime.

How does a tribe representing less than 10% of Yemen’s population impose its rule over the majority, wage multiple wars, blockade Bab al-Mandab, disrupt international shipping, and even clash with wealthy neighbors like Saudi Arabia?

Had Israel defeated the Houthis, raised its flag in Sanaa, and unified Yemen, most Yemenis might have welcomed it—similar to how many Lebanese and Syrians reportedly appreciate Israel’s strikes on Hezbollah and the weakening of Assad’s regime. But between such statements and reality lies a vast gap far greater than the distance from Israel to Yemen.

In this context, Katz’s statement about replacing the Houthi flag with Israel’s blue-and-white in Sanaa sounds theoretically possible. A legitimate, UN-recognized Yemeni government exists in Aden, aiming to unify Yemen—not under the Israeli flag, but under the country’s official flag, replacing the Houthi banner.

Had Israel defeated the Houthis, raised its flag in Sanaa, and unified Yemen, most Yemenis might have welcomed it—similar to how many Lebanese and Syrians reportedly appreciate Israel’s strikes on Hezbollah and the weakening of Assad’s regime. But between such statements and reality lies a vast gap far greater than the distance from Israel to Yemen.

Why? First, Israeli security views Yemen not as a national problem but an international one. The Houthis threaten Gulf stability, primarily Saudi Arabia, disrupt Egypt’s economy by targeting shipping through the Suez Canal, and affect global trade—while the damage to Israel, despite the closure of Eilat port, is minimal.

The issue is that all countries affected by Houthi piracy and terror prefer silence. As expected, they rely on Israel to do what the German chancellor once called “the dirty work” against Iran’s nuclear program.

Second—and it’s no secret—Trump’s administration, especially friendly to Israel, reached a non-aggression deal with the Houthis. On May 6, 2025, the U.S. announced it would halt bombings in Yemen in exchange for a Houthi commitment to stop attacking ships in the Red Sea. In effect, Trump gave them free rein to continue striking Israel without Washington’s intervention. The Houthis vowed to continue attacks as long as Israel remains active in Gaza, removing the only international check on them.

What remains is the government of South Yemen, expected to realize Katz’s vision. In reality, it is a puppet administration struggling to control Aden, let alone the vast territory officially under its sovereignty.

Control in southern Yemen lies with Saudi Arabia, which appointed the prime minister and manages state affairs via its ambassador in Aden. The puppet government is divided: one faction loyal to Riyadh, another to the UAE, which controls security forces.

At the time of writing, a South Yemen delegation is in Riyadh after a UAE-backed coup attempt, prompting the Saudi-supported president to threaten resignation. Katz may desire Yemeni unification, but neither Trump nor Israel’s Abraham Accords partners—the UAE and Saudi Arabia—are eager to end Yemen’s tragedy.

Another question arises: why don’t Abu Dhabi and Riyadh, close allies, unite against the Houthis? The answer: Saudi Arabia seeks no resolution. In April, it signed yet another ceasefire with the Houthis to prevent attacks on its oil infrastructure.

This status quo suits Saudi Arabia: the Houthis focus on Israel, Saudi Arabia stays out of the conflict, and it benefits from Israeli strikes on Houthi infrastructure and leaders. At the same time, it emphasizes its distance from Israel—initiating a UN conference on Palestinian state recognition, condemning Israel in Gaza, hosting an Arab summit in Doha after an attempted Hamas leadership assassination, and even welcoming Iran’s foreign minister, patron of the Houthis, into the Arab front against “the Israeli threat destabilizing the region.”

What lesson does Yemen hold for Israel regarding Gaza’s “day after”? Can the so-called “moderate Sunni states” produce an Arab policing force to replace Hamas? How many factions will operate under Saudi and Emirati patronage? Will Mohammed Dahlan lead Gaza’s security under the UAE, and Hussein al-Sheikh the West Bank under Saudi auspices? And whom will Egypt, Turkey, or even Iran support?

What stability is possible in Gaza when competing factions rely on bribery for loyalty? How can radical Islamist forces be prevented from emerging when Palestinians suffer under Arab states that claim to care but exploit them?

Talk of an Arab force replacing Hamas is an illusion—just as Katz’s flag-raising in Sanaa is a distant dream. Yemen and Palestine are entwined: without independent democratic movements free from corrupt Arab states, neither society has a viable future.